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Book Reviews
THE PHILANTHROPOIDS: FOUNDATIONS AND SOCIETY.

By

Ben Whitaker.t New York: William Morrow & Company, 1974. Pp. 256. $7.95.
Instances have occurred of applicants who, after receiving a
grant, are never heard of again. (Trustees should hesitate to
criticize them: an acknowledgement of failure may be less reprehensible than the production of useless work.)'
"A good man can turn in an impressive performance even
though the plan he submits is faulty: but the best plan in the
world cannot insure success if the man involved is incompetent."'
Some books are intended not to become best sellers. Ben Whitaker's The Philanthropoids:Foundations and Society is such a
book. We predict the author's intention will be realized beyond even
his expectations, for Mr. Whitaker has amassed a book with more
diligence than style, but yet more style than sense.
We have long needed a thorough study of the work of
foundations-though in any sensible hierarchy of national needs,
such a study would clearly rank somewhere between tax reform and
a good five cent cigar. Mr. Whitaker's book has not altered this fact.
The Philanthropoidsis, ironically, strongest where it is weakest.
Mr. Whitaker's strength lies in his attention to details; he has obviously spent much time patiently culling endless minutiae which
he painstakingly lays before his readers, often to little coherent
purpose. Psychiatrists doubtless have some appropriate Latin term
to describe the compulsive compilation of trivial information.
Whatever the term, the behavior it describes is commonly a private
idiosyncrasy.3 Reduced to print, though, the idiosyncrasy becomes
a vice, thwarting communication and obscuring sense. We could
t Former member of Parliament; former Junior Minister for Overseas Development.
1. B. WHITAKER, THE PHILANTHROPOIDS: FOUNDATIONS AND SOCIETr 197 (1974) [hereinafter

cited

as WHITAKER].

2. Id. at 84, quoting John Gardner.
3. Leo Rosten, who apparently is as ignorant of the term as we are, describes the behavior
sympathetically in his essay L. ROSTEN, Wilbur, in PEOPLE I HAVE LOVED, KNOWN OR ADMIRED
(1970).
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have managed our lives perfectly well without the knowledgeimparted on the first page of the first chapter-that Week's
Charity was founded in fifteenth century England to buy faggots
with which to burn heretics.4 Two pages later Mr. Whitaker tells5
of five other ancient charities of similar contemporary importance.
The lists of accumulated information seem endless; Mr. Whitaker
fills almost three pages with a list of examples supporting the
simple and generally accepted assertion that the "overlap between
U.S. Government (particularly its foreign service) and foundation
personnel is remarkable." 6 Surprisingly, this list, including such
notable public men as McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger, and Robert McNamara does not lead Mr. Whitaker to qualify
his approving use of Nick Stacey's remark:
"The sincere and well-meaning but elderly and cautious people
with a high threshold of boredom who dominate the web of
honorary committees that control most charities shrink from
the cut and thrust of the political arena where the real battle
is often being fought . . . .
Mr. Whitaker lists politically liberal foundations (a scant page) 8
and politically conservative foundations (two and a half pages)., He
devotes a whole chapter to listing the founders of various foundations and their diverse motives for philanthropy.' 0 We could continue, but our point is made.
Mr. Whitaker's sense of style is also idiosyncratic, sometimes
erroneously pedantic, sometimes clich6-ridden, and sometimes laid
waste by metaphors. The title itself, a professionally cute non-word,
foretells the muddle within. Since these accusations strike at an
author's vitals, we think fairness to Mr. Whitaker demands an explanation. The author is at times pedantic in useless and selfdefeating ways. There is no other fair way to describe the occurrence
of these two sentences on the same page: "Si monumentum requiris,
circumspice: though few people trouble to do so" and "The majority, whose lives never touch foundations, find it hard to resist a
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

WHITAKER at 11.

Id. at 13 n.2.
Id. at 97-100.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153-55.
Id. at 46-70.
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certain schadenfreude at their troubles." 1 ' Nor is there any other fair
way to describe his mis-use of the protective notation "(sic)", in
perfectly correct sentences. Thus he quotes an 1867 resolution of the
trustees of the Peabody Fund:
"[A] great Trust of this sort should have a public and permanent record . . . with this view . . . it is intended that all...
Reports and Proceedings shall be stereotyped (sic) . . . so that
a complete series may never be wanting in the Public Libraries
of the country."'"
Apparently Mr. Whitaker is unaware of the stereotype process of
printing in which type is cast using a mold, usually of paper pulp.
In a later chapter he quotes former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, "'When the Central Intelligence Agency lent (sic)
financial support to the work of certain American private organizations. . . .' "'I The phrase "to lend support" may be strange to Mr.
Whitaker's English ears, but it is clearly an acceptable American
expression which does not warrant the pedantic "(sic)". Even if Mr.
Whitaker is insensitive to such niceties of American usage, his publisher, William Morrow and Company, Inc. of New York, and its
editor should be aware of them.
Mr. Whitaker occasionally succumbs to cliches; indeed, he sometimes invents his own: "Just as it is easier to practice Christian
virtues among the poor than amongst the rich, so foundations in a
sense come to depend on the existence of problems."' 4 He and some
of the foundation staff and trustees he describes seem concerned
with the strategy of "pump-priming," once a vital figure of speech,
long ago reduced to clich6. 5 But Mr. Whitaker occasionally
transcends cliches. Readers will be reassured to discover that "many
activities which deserve support are not like a pump."'" At one
point, Mr. Whitaker magically muddles his figures of speech in an
assault upon the remaining dignity of the language:
The risks of kiss-and-run pump-priming by foundations are
redoubled in overseas programs, where the donors do not have
to live with the results. Such coitus-interruptus can generate
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 26.
at 132.
at 160.
at 80.
at 78.
at 83.
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what Aaron Wildavsky said about the anti-poverty program
17

Such writing at best obscures a writer's valid points. Often it goes
beyond obstruction, reflecting a clich6-limited thought process
which impedes original thinking and clear vision. Perhaps Mr. Whitaker himself best described the problem: "Some people, by their
nature, shine orally; others on paper-though written [sic] ability
often has an advantage . . . . 8
Readers willing to suffer the book's defects to learn Mr. Whitaker's views on the present state of the foundations and on their
future will find that some of his views merely reflect the conventional wisdom concerning the role of foundations; his other views
tend to be eccentric. Mr. Whitaker clearly recognizes that endowed
foundations are invariably created by Rockefellers and Carnegies,
wealthy men who achieved success in ways approved by conservative elements of our society. The people such men choose to staff
and control their foundations tend to have backgrounds and values
similar to those of the founders. Mr. Whitaker correctly observes
there are no radical foundations. That conservative and elitist trustees tend to favor tinkering with the problems of the existing social
order rather than overthrowing that order is no surprise. What is
surprising is that Mr. Whitaker at times seems to deplore these
tendencies. Mr. Whitaker argues that modern foundations exist
only because of their doubly-favored tax status. The wealthy are
encouraged to fund foundations and other charitable activities by
tax laws allowing them income tax deductions; thus, a taxpayer in
the highest tax bracket who contributes securities to a foundation
may give the foundation $1,000 by foregoing an after-tax income of
only $50. Moreover, the income and the property of foundations are
virtually tax exempt. Mr. Whitaker argues that this favored tax
treatment for foundations burdens all taxpayers with a larger share
of the support of government programs than they would bear if
foundations and their donors were given no tax relief. He therefore
concludes that the taxpayers are the real source of the wealth of
foundations, and that foundations should therefore reflect the interests and needs of taxpayers; they should be more democratic. The
non-sequitur is fairly obvious. While the government has the power
to change the tax treatment of charitable foundations and of their
17.
18.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 204.
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donors, and while it may have the power to implant public representatives on their boards, serious changes in the existing laws
would predictably discourage future donations and limit the public
good which foundations presently achieve. Taxpayers do not create
foundations, they merely permit the wealthy to create them. The
added tax burden imposed by the existence of untaxed foundations
is indirect, and is small enough that the taxpayers and the government choose to leave foundations untaxed and largely independent.
We can imagine our society operating without private foundations. Public bodies already are duplicating their functions. The
Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National Endowment
for the Humanities are two publicly funded semi-independent agencies which act like foundations but which are forced to rely on periodic public appropriations which may make them more cautious
politically than privately endowed foundations are. We cannot,
however, imagine the creation of new foundations without the liberal tax incentives and the room for private control which now exist.
It would be a mistake to act on Mr. Whitaker's suggestion that
foundations are really financed by taxes and therefore should be
more democratic.
Another major theme of The Philanthropoidsis that the best
argument for the continued existence of private foundations is their
political independence which enables them to pursue projects which
the government cannot or will not pursue. This is true only to a
limited extent. There are some socially valuable projects in which
we forbid government involvement. Most notable is aid to religion
and religious education, where private foundations and charities
may act, with the advantages of tax deductions. 9 There are some
politically sensitive projects which the government will not fund but
which still ought to be pursued. The early efforts at integration were
funded by private foundations at a time when political factors prevented governmental action. There are some projects of such limited
public importance that they cannot obtain adequate public support
and must rely on private support. (The number and importance of
such projects can be exaggerated; the passage of the Federal Jellyfish Control Act in 1966 shows that anything can qualify for public
support if it isn't controversial.) The performing arts, public broadcasting, and private colleges are often inadequately supported by
19.
20t

See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1970).
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public appropriations and therefore rely heavily on private foundations.
Foundation support in each of these areas helps to justify the
government's continued indulgence of tax-free foundations. But the
degree of political independence foundations enjoy, and the ethical
obligations inherent in that independence can be exaggerated. Direct political activity by foundations is prohibited in both the
United States and the United Kingdom. Foundations which become
too politically active for the tax collector's taste may lose their tax
exemption which may in turn lead to the civil liability of their
trustees for the resulting losses. The line between legitimate educational activities and illegitimate political action varies from time to
time and from place to place; prudent trustees stay well clear of that
line. Moreover, the pursuit of politically unpopular programs may
lead to unwelcome publicity, investigations, and restrictive legislation. Thus in 1952, the House of Representatives established the
Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and

Comparable Organizations. The Committee, chaired and dominated by conservatives seeking to discredit liberal domestic projects
and international operations by the major foundations, posed
enough of a threat to lead many foundations away from politically
controversial projects into innocuous ones. Similarly, the sections of
the 1969 Tax Reform Act 2 which for the first time imposed significant federal controls on foundations followed public disclosure of
politically controversial foundation activities. The lauugcikgr the
trustees was obvious: seek politically innocuous projects or suffer
the consequences. Mr. Whitaker understands this; indeed, he outlines the history of congressional reaction to controversial foundation programs. Consequently, much of his emphasis on the political
independence of foundations as their principal justification for existing is exaggerated.
What Mr. Whitaker does not say, and what needs to be emphasized, is that the pursuits which best justify the existence of foundations today are the politically bland but valuable programs which
are their principal pursuits. Foundation support for the arts (though
it is all too frequently limited to apolitical and stylistically conservative artists who will not cause controversy or alarm the conservative tastes of trustees) preserves much that is valuable in modem
21.

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4940-48 (1970);

WHITAKER

at 234-35.
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American cultural life under circumstances where politicians could
not justify more than a trifling commitment of public support and
where the public is unwilling to provide the necessary support in the
form of admission costs. Foundation support for scientific research
provides a vital supplement to the already heavy public commitment of funds. If large amounts of the available public support for
scientific research are disbursed through a single public office,
worthwhile projects which do not seem valuable or promising to the
small group of people who control that office will-quite properly-be denied funding. The existence of private foundations
helps to decentralize the process of selecting worthwhile projects
and prevents any single small group of experts from channeling
scientific research too narrowly. The fact that the famed "Green
Revolution ' 22 derives largely from research funded by the Rockefeller Foundation rather than by the Department of Agriculture suggests the value of private foundations as an independent source of
°support for research.
We do not mean to suggest that the structure and operation of
foundations today are perfect; no prudent authors ever admit that
they could not improve upon existing institutions, even when that
is clearly the case. The maddening restrictions on political educational activities which magnify the political power of special interest
groups ought to be eliminated. We would favor a limited tax credit
and a revision of the present deduction system for charitable contributions. Things now seem topsy-turvy. When we contribute $100 to
charity, it has really cost us $75 after taxes. Our wealthy neighbor
who can better afford the gift can contribute $100 at an after-tax
cost to him of only $5. We don't want to remove our neighbor's
incentive to give, but we would like to see our favored causes similarly benefited; the limited tax credit coupled with regulated deductions for excess contributions would do just that. The introduction
of such a system would predictably broaden the base of foundation
support, and consequently their activity.
Carol B. Hirsch*
Kenneth L. Hirsch**
22. WHMAK
at 172-73.
*B.A., Lawrence University; Graduate Student, Duquesne University.
**B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois; LL.M., Harvard University; Associate Professor, Duquesne University School of Law.
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CONGLOMERATES UNLIMITED: THE FAILURE OF REGULA-

By John F. Winslow.t Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973. Pp. xx, 296. $10.00.

TION.

Unhappily, the loftiest motivation yet conceived by economists
as engine to equitably distribute the resources of the earth
among its inhabitants is greed.
Adam Smith, circa 1776
This book depicts rampant, brazen greed-not employed to optimize availability of goods and services for the greatest possible
number, as Adam Smith perhaps intended, but to furnish selfish
personal gain for a few.
There is little doubt, to this reviewer at least, that the free market
place is a better economic and political contrivance than regulation
of supply, price, and distribution by government agencies. To bolster this faith it is comforting to have present a multiplicity of
buyers and sellers, ease of entry by others, and some degree of
adequacy to information about the market. Also necessary to support this faith is effective government policing (via antitrust, antimerger, and disclosure provisions) of those who persistently appear
to attempt to prostitute the system.
Important governmental investigations have recently produced
significant documents.' These lengthy reports and studies should be
read by all scholars in this area. Winslow, counsel to the Antitrust
Subcommittee during its investigation, has, in this short volume,
made this important information available to the public by summarizing these lengthy hearings and reports.
This is a "muckraking" book in the best sense of that word and
tradition. That is, it fairly sets out the facts and they shock. Ida
Tarbell practiced this trade well in her History of the Standard Oil
Company2 and undoubtedly influenced the passage of some of our
fundamental trade regulation laws. It is the unhappy conclusion of
t Former counsel to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives.
1. STAFF OF ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 92D CONG., 1ST
SESS., INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS (1971); Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969-70),
INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS; Hearings Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969-70),
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION; FTC, ECONosnc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969).
2. I. TARBELL, HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1902).
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this book that, despite the exposure of the excesses in the reports
and studies cited above, there has been, so far, no legislative response.
The manipulation for profit by Roy Ash, as president of Litton
Industries, of the Ingalls Ship-Building Corp. of Pascagoula, Mississippi, acquired by the Litton conglomerate, deprived the United
States Navy of as many fighting ships as would an encounter with
a well-prepared enemy squadron at sea. Roy Ash resigned as president of Litton in December, 1972 to become Director of the United
States Office of Management and Budget. Winslow notes, "On assuming that office, which determines federal expenditure, Mr. Ash
stated that he would not divorce himself from decisions affecting the
Navy." 3
Gulf and Western Industries, ITT, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
Penn Central Railroad, and other conglomerates undertook
hundreds of acquisitions, and faked scores of others, not in response
to the needs of the economy for more efficient production and distribution of needed commodities and services, but to obtain personal
gains. In the Introduction, Professor Irwin M. Grossack of Indiana
University notes,:.
First, they purchase stock in the target company for their personal accounts; then, when their firm offers a high price for
that stock, they sell their personal holdings of target company
stock at the higher price. Insiders in the target company can
gain by the same means, and may be induced to cooperate
with, and provide information to, the acquiring firm. These
personal gains can come about by promises of good jobs as well
as profiting in the stock market. Insiders of the acquiring firm
can also personally profit, after obtaining control, by "looting"
or "milking" the target firm by having the target firm sell its
assets at low prices to closely held firms controlled by the insiders. There are, clearly, endless possibilities for personal gains
along these lines.4
There are, indeed, endless variations. After the arrangement for
an ITT-Hartford settlement with the Antitrust Division, but before
its announcement to the public, ITT Senior Vice President-Counsel
Howard J. Aibel and ITT Secretary-Counsel John J. Navin person3. J. WINSLOW, CONGLOMERATES
[hereinafter cited as WINSLOW].
4. Id. at xiii.

UNLIMITED: THE FAILURE OF REGULATION
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ally sold substantial blocks of ITT shares.5 On the first trading day
after announcement of the settlement to the public, ITT stock fell
by $7 per share. The private investor-the little old lady in tennis
shoes-was the loser. It is little wonder that in 1974 we find that
millions of investors have retreated from the capital markets.
There is enough reported in this book alone respecting the conflicts of interest of bankers who "serve" as directors of corporations
to convince one that Section 8 of the Clayton Act' should be
amended to prohibit bank representatives from serving on boards of
firms which are debtors or prospective debtors to the bank. The
I.C.C.'s own study of the Penn Central bankruptcy attributes
largely to banker-directors the devastating policy that dividends be
paid while the conglomerate incurred overall operating losses.7 Further, banks use inside information to profit from manipulations of
the stock which their acquisition loans are affecting; and banks
employ the leverage of their lending power to exercise reciprocity to
garner the deposits of the conglomerates they finance.
Investors are also misled by "imaginative accounting." In 1968,
Penn Central reported a loss of more than $20 million as an $88
million profit. Profits can be inflated by adding to the income figure
amounts which should not be added. For example, Gulf and Western added to operating earnings its non-recurring, non-operating
gains from the sale of securities on the stock market. Profits can also
be inflated by failing to subtract amounts which should be subtracted. Penn Central, for example, failed to deduct from its income
figure vast sums paid in wages and the cost of depreciation of machinery; they charged equipment repair costs to capital rather than to
operating expenses.' Where the Navy agreed in settlement to pay
Litton no more than $7 million of a $73.8 million claim, this was
reported on Litton's books as a $22.8 million "current asset."
The Securities Acts of 19331 and 1934's fundamentally sought
5. These two men are lawyers. In 1974 ABA President Chesterfield Smith, in effect, made
a demand for legal ethics and legal public responsibility, by calling upon lawyers to "right
the wrongs of Watergate." The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 13, 1974, at 3, col. 1. One
wonders why there should not be a similar call upon corporate counsel to stop bilking the
public by use of insider information.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
7.

ICC INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BUSINESS OF THE PENN CENTRAL, Doc.

No. 35291, at 112 (March 8, 1972).
8. As a side effect, their accountants' salaries were increased in reward.
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(aa) (1970).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(hh-1) (1970).
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disclosure so that the investing public might be informed. But acquisition by a conglomerate causes the acquired firm's financial
status no longer to be accessible to the public since it is now buried
in composite statements. Another reform is brought to our attention
when Winslow points out that the Securities Act of 1933 does not
apply to railroads.
What is most brash is that if the conglomerate firm goes sour after
all these self-dealing manipulations, then the managers turn to the
government, Lockheed-like, for bailing-out-again at the expense of
the public. In 1970, Penn Central, its investors' shares having
dropped in value from a high of 86 in 1968 to 5 dollars a share, called
on the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Transportation to ask the government for a rescue loan, the first requested
payment to be $225 million. Roy Ash, Litton's former president, now
head of the United States Office of Management and Budget, urged
that the navy allocate one to two billion dollars "to help out the
nation's ship-yards." 1 Ling-Temco-Vought salvaged its Memcor
acquisitions by shifting its losses to the Pentagon.
Again, an essential of the free, open marketplace is the active
participation by many rather than few. But the practices of the
conglomerate managers and their bankers repeatedly excluded some
who should participate or might participate in the free competitive
market. Chase Manhattan financed Gulf and Western's acquisitions, asking Gulf and Western to hold off taking out loans from
Prudential and others, and requesting that Gulf and Western subsidiaries shift their deposits, even their income tax withholding deposits, from other banks to Chase Manhattan. Upon such an occasion, The Bank of the Southwest, in Houston, "put up quite a
howl."'" Practices like this continued are inimical to the concept of
the free market deemed by Jefferson and Brandeis as essential to
successful political democracy. This inevitable result is "a serious
loss of citizenship"' 3 by independent entrepreneurs. Mr. Justice
Douglas has warned against this trend.
But beyond all that there is the effect on the community when
independents are swallowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs
become employees of absentee owners. Then there is a serious
11.
12.
13.

The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 23, 1972.
WINSLOW, supra note 3, at 41.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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loss in citizenship. Local leadership is diluted. He who was a
leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders for his
action and policy. Clerks responsible to a superior in a distant
place take the place of resident proprietors beholden to no one.
These are the prices which the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in bigness on the part of industry.'"
Indeed, what does happen to the morale, spirit and independence
of the often able managers who are involuntarily acquired? Winslow
concludes, "If corporate concentration demoralizes even the corporate managers, whom but the acquisitors can it inspire?" '1
What should be done? Surely something must be done to curb
these evil men whose excesses of greed subvert the system. Their
piracy is indecent. They exhibit contempt for human values which
must be corrected. Indeed, they have forgotten that there are others
than themselves.
What should be done? The author, Winslow, points out that we
do have some existing legislation that would be helpful, if used, but
which is not enough enforced-securities and exchange regulation,
public utility regulation, regulation of transportation facilities,
banking regulation, Celler-Kefauver Act,'" and the Sherman Act,"
for example. There is need of some additional legislation-to end
I.R.S. incentives for acquisition, for instance. Is there not more to
be reconsidered? Should there be a federal incorporation law insuring uniformity and higher standards of corporate conduct? Should
there be public directors on the boards of all private corporations?
Should there be a requirement that the government be notified in
advance of any acquisition?
Finally, all the above should be reconsidered when possibilities
and opportunities are now multi-national-available to large
concentrations of capital abroad. Last year a Canadian government
corporation contemplated acquisition of Texas Gulf Sulphur; and
what will the Arabian nations do with all that money?
This book should be prescribed reading for all who believe that it
is an essential of political freedom that there be economic freedom,
that competition rather than restraints and monopoly should be the
rule of trade. It is not a law book, but it is a book for the interested
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 318-19.
WINSLOW, supra note 3, at 41.
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
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and involved public, and it should be an assigned book in undergraduate and graduate business schools.
Thomas M. Kerr*
BEFORE THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PRO-

Edited by John J. Bonsignore, Ethan Katsh,
Peter d'Errico, Ronald M. Pipkin and Stephen
Arons.t Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974.
Pp. xii, 388.,$6.95.
CESS.

The burgeoning enrollment and demand for admission to the nation's law schools has generated an accelerated interest in, and perhaps a need for, the development of new courses in the college
curriculum which provide prospective insights for the pre-law student into the legal processes and the judicial system. The multiplication of such courses in turn creates an expanding market for textual materials to be used in them. This book is designed primarily
to fill such a need.
Compiled and edited by a battery of professors from the Legal
Studies Program at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
Before The Law undertakes the awesome task of providing students
from a wide range of undergraduate backgrounds with answers to
"first questions. . . about law"' and with an anthology of readings
through which "to explore the fundamental significance of law in
society."' Structured on acknowledged arbitrary lines, the text contains an introductory chapter which surveys a sampling of the principal theoretical overviews and definitions of the nature of law,
followed by four other major sections, one each devoted to the role
of the police, the lawyer, and the jury in the legal process, and a
*

Thomas M. Kerr, Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law, and

Associate Professor of Industrial Administration and Law, Graduate School of Industrial
Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.
t The editors are professors from the Legal Studies Program at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
1. J. BONSIGNORE, E. KATSH, P. d'Euco, R. PIPKIN & S. ARONS, BEFORE THE LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PROCESS ii (1974).
2. Id.
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concluding chapter which focuses on contemporary issues and controversies regarding the problem of "law and order." While the anthology abounds in illustrative cases, it is in no traditional sense a
casebook, but rather an eclectic selection of readings tending to
emphasize the complex and controversial dimensions of policy and
practice, rather than to schematize the systematic dimensions of the
operation of law.
Readers, both inside and outside the legal profession, are likely
to applaud or attack the text chiefly in terms of their personal
preferences regarding the materials it includes or excludes as illustrative readings. There are, for example, liberal samplings from
Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush, the writings of Jerome Frank, the
historical perspectives of deTocqueville, and the now famous 1970
statement of Chief Justice Burger on the State of the Judiciary;
.notably, there is a corresponding paucity of samplings from the
traditionally regarded "great judicial" writings of Holmes, Brandeis, Pound, and Hand, to name but a few.
Critically, I am struck by the text's failure to clarify for the mind
of the beginning reader the image of the bench in relation to the bar
as a keystone in the judicial structure. One does not receive a clear
image of the role of the courts, their authority and limitations, from
this otherwise stimulating collection. This is, in my humble judgment, the work's greatest textual shortcoming.
If one were to seek a single text of moderate length (less than four
hundred pages) which distills efficiently a sampling of the
provocative issues "before the law," in contemporary life this book
will serve him admirably. On the other hand, if one's purpose is to
make available in neat summation a structured image of the principles and practices through which the law becomes (more or less
effectively) the ordering process in the society, Before The Law will
fall short of the goal. Its efficiency, in sum, is in its controversial,
rather than its expository focus.
Passingly, I should note that not the least of this text's affective
charms is its poetic orientation in both the prefatory text and section headings, which draw upon the literary as well as the legalistic
to aphorize what follows. A liberal "Notes and Questions" section
should provoke effective discussion of each entry and the bibliography appended to each chapter thoughtfully compromises between
the sketchy and the exhaustive. That this anthology can be said to
excite all thoughtful readers while having at best a limited utility
as a classroom text is not to praise it with faint damns, but rather
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to acknowledge the massiveness of its undertaking and to commend
its editors for their relative success.
James P. Beymer*
*

Chairman, English Department, Duquesne University.

